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 This article focuses on various factors related to electronic voting. The analysis 
therefore concerns formal requirements for electoral process, counting speed, number of 
invalid votes, counting errors, trust and electoral frauds, accessibility of the elections and 
turnout. In the finale the impact of e-voting is summarized and recommendation is delivered. 
The findings indicate that electronic voting can solve some problems in electoral design, but 
as well can deepen the existing ones and even create a new ones. It is therefore important to 
discuss it in context of respective electoral design, because there is no universal answer to the 
question contained in the name of the article.  
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Introduction 
 There were never in human history possible to transfer information in such amounts, 
at such distances and in such time. The digital revolution conquered our world and started 
changing it. New possibilities of spreading information opened many doors and even more 
questions in many scientific fields.  
 Paraphrasing Shakespeare’s Hamlet, to have, or not to have, that is the question of 
this article. The aim is to provide a comprehensive analysis whether to implement or whether 
not to implement electronic voting in elections.17 The perspective will be primarily from the 
point of view of political science. However some overlaps mainly into informatics and law 
will be present. As a result there will be a methodological framework, a tool suitable for use 
in any country to evaluate the possible implementation of electronic voting and to measure its 
supposed impacts. The focus will be therefore laid on both advantages as well as on 
disadvantages.  
 First of all I will briefly introduce the definition of the terms, thereafter I will lay 
down the various aspects, which are need to take in mind, when considering the 
implementation of the e-voting. After that I will summarize it into methodological framework 
and close the papers by the conclusions and recommendation.  
 
Definition  
 First of all, in order to discuss electronic voting, or e-voting, we need to define what it 
is? We could simply say that electronic voting is every voting which uses any electronic 
devices or techniques at any stage of electoral process. However, this definition would be too 
wide, because it will cover practically all types of voting, since counting  the overall results 
from the fractional results is somehow computerized. Such a definition would not be 
therefore useful. So we have to look for some better.  
 
 
                                                          
17 In this text I am using the terms “electronic voting” and “e-voting” as mutually interchangeable.  
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Table 1 – Basic division of electronic voting 
Type Technique  
Voting in supervised environment 
(Voting at polling station) 
DRE18 
Optic scanner19 
Voting in unsupervised environment  






 Council of Europe defines e-voting as “an election or referendum that involves the 
use of electronic means in at least the casting of the vote” (Council of Europe 2009, 16). I 
find this definition the most suitable for our needs in this article. However, it is quite 
predictable, that we will need more effort to distinguish different types of e-voting. There are 
plenty of definitions (see Council of Europe 2005, Kersting and Baldersheim (eds.) 2004, 
Alvarez a Hall 2004, Reterová 2008, Enguehard a Graton 2008), however for the purpose of 
this article we will content ourselves with basic division concerning the question, wheter the 
environment is or is not supervised. This means, whether or whether not the electoral officials 
have, or should have, full control on the electoral process. This division is contained in table 
no. 1.20 It is quite a simplification, but for the purpose of this analysis is such a simplification 
sufficient without loosing any information relevant to the analysis. 
 
Analysis 
Formal demands of electoral process 
 The electoral law puts in a various countries various demands towards the process of 
the elections. For instance the voter registration, is it automatic or on request? What are the 
requirements for running in the elections? Etc. This legal framework has many aspects, but at 
this place we will focus on three of the fundamental legal aspect of free and democratic 
elections, which are challenged by the e-voting.  
 First of all, there is a question of maintaining the ballot secret. On one hand, there is a 
problem connected with family voting, which means that the vote is cast under pressure of 
close relatives. Thus it is not being the expression of free will of the voter (Enguehard and 
Graton 2008, 8) and on the other hand there is a problem with the security of the electronic 
envelope, in which is the vote cast electronically. Thus the guarantee of the secret ballot is 
highly questionable.  
 Secondly there is a problem in digital divide (Norris 2001), which means that not all 
the voters are skilled enough to participate in the e-voting process. This means that replacing 
the paper ballots by some kind of e-voting would, or should, make the elections inaccessible 
for some voters, the ones, who are not able or willing to participate via the electronic way. 
Thus the suffrage should be viewed as not universal and therefore unconstitutional in many 
countries. With this is closely connected the argument of saving money through using e-
voting. This argument is fragile, since it is necessary to implement e-voting as a technique 
complementary to the paper ballots. So in a short term the e-voting will require additional 
                                                          
18 Direct-recording electronic voting system. In this paper I will understand under this term kiosk voting as well 
as voting terminals and intranet poll site voting.  
19 Votes are cast via a ballot in the polling station, the computerization is in fact, that the votes are scanned and 
counted by a computer.  
20 To be complex, we can as well define remote non-electronic voting, which will be the category for postal 
voting and similar techniques, or we can say, that paper ballot cast in the polling station is an example of non-
remote and non-electronic voting, or the non-electronic voting in the supervised environment respectively.  
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money from public budgets. Some kind of saving is imaginable only in long term and hand to 
hand with reducing number of polling stations or leaving the paper ballot at all.  
And finally, the principle of free elections requires that the votes are counted authentically, 
which means that there is an option for verification through recalculation for the purpose of 
judicial review. Some electronic techniques did not allow this recalculation, because the vote 
does not exist in a physical form.21 
 These are three main legal obstacles for e-voting implementation and as well the three 
main legal threats, which should be considered by legislators, who are thinking about to 
implement e-voting in their countries. This thread is not illusory, but real, the e-voting in all 
of its forms were abolished in several countries, for instance in 2004 in Ireland (Smith 2009, 
7), the Netherlands in 2007 (Loeber 2008), Paraguay in 2008 and Germany in 2009 (Barratt i 
Esteve, Goldsmith and Turner 2012). It is important to understand that every cancellation of 
e-voting goes hand to hand with a wasting quite significant amount of taxpayer money.   
 
Counting speed  
 It is important to have real electoral results as soon as possible. Any delay of 
delivering the final count should foster instability and even some sorts of public unrest. Long 
counting time should also hurt the credibility of the elections. It is undisputable, that e-voting 
in all of its forms greatly increase the counting speed of the elections. The result should be 
recorded de facto instantly.  
 Brilliant example of successfully reducing the time needed for counting the votes is 
Brazil, where implementation of DRE shortened it from approximately one month to 30 
hours “only” (Reterová 2007, 219). However this can be applied only on electronically casted 
votes, so the speed increase depends on amount of votes casted this way, because for paper 
ballots there will be still necessity to count them manually.  
 
Number of invalid votes 
 E-voting, in case that it is properly programmed, can as well eliminate any invalid 
votes, simply by not allowing voter to cast such a vote, or by permitting voter to cast invalid 
vote only after explicit confirmation.  
 It is important to look for the roots of the high numbers of invalid votes. (1) They can 
be cast as a sign of protest or (2) by an accident. In such case, the blame should go to low 
level of literacy, or basically to low level of election procedure awareness, or to the fact that 
electoral procedure is way too complicated. (3) And last but not least, the electoral law 
regarding the validity of the vote under the examination. The reasons for each country may 
differ, and detailed identification of the reasons for each country is not purpose of this paper.  
However, if we take a short look on the data22 about percentage of invalid votes casted in the 
last parliamentary elections, we will see that there are totally 77 territories with percentage of 
invalid votes above 2 % out from the 160 territories monitored in the dataset. Regarding 
direct presidential elections instead of the parliamentary, we will get the number 61 out of 
103. The high score is in parliamentary elections 19 % for Morocco in 2007, 15.6 % for 
Mauritania in 2006, 14.4 % for Algeria in 2007, 14.38 % for Indonesia in 2009, 11.45 % for 
Honduras in 2009, 11.25 % for Mozambique in 2009 and 10.58 % for Angola in 2008. The 
rest are under 10 %. In presidential elections is the score: 13.52 % for Comoros in 2010, 
13.09 % for Angola in 1992, 11.9 % for Philippines in 2004 and 10.8 % for Yemen in 2006. 
Again, the rest are under 10 %.  
                                                          
21 This problem does not concern the optical scanners and some types of DRE, but it is inherent to all sorts of 
remote electronic voting.  
22 Accessible at the website of Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, www.idea.int.  
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 Among these countries are as well some of the developed countries, as it can be 
observed in table no. 2. For the countries with high share of invalid votes should be 
implementation of e-voting one of the solution of this problem. However closer examination 
of the reasons, why there are so many invalid votes, should be on the first place.  
 
Table 2 – % of invalid votes in developed countries23 
Country Parliamentary elections Presidential elections  
Chile 8.92 (2009) 3.39 (2010) 
Luxembourg 6.45 (2009) - 
San Marino 6.43 (2012) - 
Belgium 5.8 (2010) - 
Australia 5.6 (2010) - 
Lithuania 5.48 (2012) 1.27 (2009)  
Poland 4.52 (2011) 1.16 (2010) 
Andorra 4.24 (2011) - 
Portugal 4.08 (2011) 5.07 (2011) 
Palau 4 (2008) - 
Italy 3.59 (2013) - 
Liechtenstein 2.9 (2009) - 
Costa Rica 2.6 (2010) 2 (2010) 
Saint Lucia 2.52 (2011) - 
France 2.14 (2012) 4.68 (2012)  
Cyprus 2.08 (2011) 3.31 (2013) 
Nauru 2.03 (2010) - 
Source: www.idea.int, ranked and selected by the author 
 
Counting errors 
 Research made by Ansolabehere and Reeves shows that there is approximately 1 % 
error in counting votes manually (Ansolabehere and Reeves 2004). This research was made 
however on the results of First-past-the-post electoral system in New Hampshire from 1946 
to 2002, so it is likely to assume that under conditions of more complicated, or perhaps 
sophisticated, electoral systems24 the results would exhibit larger share of errors.  
E-voting can for sure lower the percentage of miscounted votes. But again it depends on 
amount of electronically casted votes. It can be said in general that impact of e-voting 
implementation is greater in more complex electoral designs.  
 
Trust and electoral frauds 
 In any case, when e-voting is considered, it is necessary for its successful functioning, 
some level of public trust. Without this, at least elementary, confidence, e-voting can strongly 
damage the legitimacy of the elections.  
 Thus it is better to implement e-voting in countries, where there is strong public 
confidence towards government and generally towards electronic tools in the lives of citizens.  
One of the weak points, or perhaps the weakest one, of e-voting is problem with electoral 
frauds. When there is no ability to recount the votes and as well no option for voters to check, 
whether he or she really casted the vote for a party or candidate he or she intended to vote,25 
                                                          
23 With score 1, so the best, in Freedom House index.  
24 The First-past-the-post electoral system is simple regarding to examine the election results.  
25 This critique is not valid in case of optical scanners.  
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it is easier to conduct electoral frauds. So the manipulation of the results by the government 
or the officials is easy under e-voting.  
 Similar problem is with the voting in unsupervised environment. (1) There is risk with 
so called “family voting” (Krimmer and Volkamer 2005, 226) and other kinds of voting 
under some sort of pressure, so non-free voting is more likely, when votes are cast in 
unsupervised environment. (2) Also voting in unsupervised environment simplifies the 
situation for the ones, who are buying the votes, bribing the voters respectively.  
Any sorts of e-voting, and the ones used in unsupervised environment, should be therefore 
implemented rather in territories with low level of risk of electoral frauds.  
 
Accessibility of the elections 
 Another aspect of the election is its accessibility. It means as well the accessibility of 
the polling stations for the electors. This is mostly the problem for the voters abroad and for 
the voter swith some kind of disability (especially for the sightless and with similar disability, 
in general the voters with special needs).26  
E-Voting, which can contain voice assistance, is therefore a good option to solve the 
problems in countries with plenty of voters living abroad and as a technique to make voting 
easier for people with disability.  
 
Turnout  
 Last but not the least factor I would like to focus is turnout. First of all, is good to 
point out, that there is in political science on one hand approach, which considers the turnout 
to be a “brilliant indicator of quality of democracy” (Lijphart 1994, 4). On the other hand, is 
being pointed out that it is important to examine the reasons of non-participation in the 
elections and that one of the reasons can be satisfaction with current state (Novák 1998, 133). 
Important is as well the context of the elections. For voter, the non-participation can simply 
be the best strategic option, for instance in cases, where he or she has no opinion which party 
to vote, or in case, when he or she is satisfied with every likely scenario of the outcome. It 
cannot be said therefore, that high or low turnout, without examining the reasons, is a good 
indicator of quality of corresponding democracy (Lipset 1981). 
 In the light of results from Estonia, which was one of the pioneers of e-voting, it is 
quite unimportant at which position we stand in a dispute, which is sketched above. Because 
the data from the research made by Trechsel and Vassil shows, that possible contribution to 
the turnout via use of e-voting27 is from 0.3 % in local elections in 2005 to 3.5 % in 
parliamentary elections in 2011 (Trechsel and Vassil 2011).  
 My role here is not to judge whether these numbers are high or law. Such a judgment 
is subjective. So I will be content to say, that the e-voting, in its remote form leads to an 
increase in turnout, however it would be naïve to expect an increase in tens of percent.  
 
Conclusion and recommendations  
 All the described factors are summarized in SWOT analysis in table 3. It is quite 
obvious on first look, that e-voting has several strengths and as well several weaknesses, 
there are also some opportunities and, however, plenty of threats.  
 As it was shown above, the electronic voting has the ability to solve some problems 
connected to electoral process and as well the ability to make some problems even bigger. 
 Therefore I strongly recommend to think about it only as one of many electoral 
                                                          
26 Just this reason, to enable voting to sightless and similarly disabled, was the reason to implement system of 
iVote in New South Wales, Australia, where it is possible to cast votes via internet and telephone since the 
elections in 2011.  
27 In case of Estonia voting through the internet.  
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techniques28 and to begin the discussion whether to implement or not to implement e-voting 
with description of current state of the facts. When the problems and weaknesses of 
respective electoral designs are known, the discussion if the solution can be to implement 
some sort of e-voting can start.  
 
Table 3 – SWOT analysis of e-voting 
STRENGTHS WEAKNESSES  
Decrease of:  
• number of invalid votes 
• errors in counting  
Increase of:  
• accessibility of the voting (especially 
for voter with special needs) 
• counting speed  
Disputable law and constitutional conformity 
Cost of implementation and maintaining  
Electoral frauds are easier to conduct  
OPPORTUNITIES  THREATS  
Increase in turnout* 
Saving the expenditure for voting 
organization (in long-term)  
System failure caused by the hacker attack or 
by electoral official:  
• manipulation with the outcome 
• decommissioning system from 
operation 
Threats to the legitimacy of the election 
Failure to use the system because of low 
public confidence 




 The answer to the question to have it or not have it, is not scientific, but purely 
political one. The lawmakers have to consider the cost and possible benefits and thereafter 
they have to decide.  
 It can be said in general, that e-voting can be a viable option for territories with high 
level of confidence into government and officials, with high data network penetration 
throughout the population29 and with problems with slow speed of counting and low 
accessibility of the elections and for the ones, which are facing a very low turnouts.  
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